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Abstract 
Coma is very common in popular culture. Soap opera characters are regularly left in 
comatosed or vegetative states after accidents or assaults; Newspaper headlines report 
miracle awakenings, end-of-life court hearings or scientific breakthroughs in 
detecting consciousness. This chapter reviews studies addressing the media coverage 
of coma (and coma-like conditions) in order to offer ways of thinking about research 




Media representation of science and health are a key area of concern for researchers 
interested in the potential of the media to influence society – whether through helping 
to shape individual behaviours, public debates or the policy agenda. This chapter uses 
research on ‘coma’ (and associated conditions such as the vegetative state) as a case 
study for exploring the range of ways in which media coverage can be analysed. I 
show how researchers from different backgrounds (e.g. film and cultural studies, 
sociology of science, and scientific/clinical practice) have approached such research 
and highlight their different research designs and findings. I conclude by highlighting 
the need to take such disciplinary divisions into account – both when reviewing 
research into the media representation of science and health and when developing 
such research oneself. 
  
 
Researching media representation of scientific and health issues - questions and 
methods 
Scholars interested in the representation of science and health issues ask questions 
such as: how do media accounts compare to the scientific or clinical ‘facts’, or the 
experience of patients or the range of diverse ethical or political perspectives in 
society as a whole. Specific analysis may examine: Which issues are given 
prominence? How are ideas framed? What ‘facts’ are given credence? Whose voice is 
heard? How is expertise accredited? How are key players represented (e.g. the 
scientist, medics, patients or their families)? Such scholars are interested in the forces 
that help shape representation and  also implicitly, or explicitly, concerned about the 
potential impact on individual or collective ways of thinking, talking or acting, or the 
impact on wider public discourses or policy priorities. Such research includes both 
quantitative and qualitative analysis and the object of analysis can be any text, 
including, for example, news reports, magazines, soap opera, science fiction films, 
home videos or new media. Research designs may simply focus on media texts, but 
can also include talking to, or observing, media producers (e.g. science journalists), 
examining source activity (e.g. press releases from science funding bodies) and 
looking at ‘public’ opinion or audience reception (e.g. attempting to assess any 
potential influence upon health behaviours). 
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The focus of any individual research project, and the methods adopted, often depends 
on the disciplinary background of the researchers or the priorities of the funding 
bodies. For example, science organisations often fund research that documents and 
tries to change the ways in which science is represented; a health charity may 
particularly want to explore the stigma associated with particular health conditions, 
and an academic working in a department of bioethics is more likely to be concerned 
with the framing of the ethics. The variety of questions asked and approaches adopted 




Why is ‘coma’ such an important science/health story? 
Coma is a fascinating case study through which to examine research into the 
representations of science and health and has increasingly attracted media attention 
over the last few decades. News stories track the tragic injury of celebrities and 
headlines profile ‘right-to-die’ cases and scientific ‘breakthroughs’ into investigating 
consciousness. Coma also serves as a popular plot device in soap opera (conveniently 
suspending an actor’s role in the series or introducing dramatic tensions), and features 
as a central focus of some science fiction, crystalising concerns about the uses of 
modern medical technology’ (Belling 2010). The possibility that someone may be 
kept alive, but without any consciousness or agency – makes ‘coma’ (and conditions 
often associated with coma, such as the vegetative state) has significant ramifications. 
Coma is implicated in debates about the nature of the mind or soul, personhood, 
dignity, choice and the meaning of life itself and the ability of modern medicine to 
sustain people in coma-like states means that this is an issue of increasing social 
importance (with significant economic, social and moral costs) and a key site of 
contestation. 
 
Public debates about this issue can be traced back to the 1970s – when conditions 
such as ‘brain death’ and ‘the vegetative state’ started to become the focus of medical, 
ethical and public concern (e.g. in relation to organ donation and end-of-life decision-
making). The medical thriller ‘Coma’ was written (and converted into a film) in the 
1970s but the issue of the vegetative state did not gain particular public attention until 
more recently when it burst onto the public scene in the US with the ‘Schiavo case’. 
Debate centred around a young woman (Terri Schiavo) who had suffered a cardiac 
arrest in 1990 leaving her in a vegetative state and who became subject to a series of 
court cases from 1998 onwards. Her husband and her family were in dispute over her 
level of consciousness, and whether or not she would have wanted life-sustaining 
treatment. Schiavo was eventually allowed to die in 2005 after her feeding tube was 
withdrawn. The case became a political and legal minefield and attracted huge 
amounts of media attention and resulted in controversy across the US and 
internationally. 
 
Some definitions – a briefing on clinical diagnoses  
Before discussing the media representation of Terri Schiavo’s case in particular, and 
the issues more generally, it is necessary to step back and provide definitions of key 
medical terms. This is important not least because general understanding (and media 
representation) of this field often confuse clinically distinct conditions. 
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 A coma is a term which usually only applies to the first few weeks of 
unconsciousness in most brain injured patients. A comatose patient who does not die 
(or ‘wake up’) in the first few weeks usually enters either a vegetative or a minimally 
conscious state [‘VS’ or ‘MCS’]. ‘Brain death’ is something entirely different, as is 
‘locked in’ syndrome, so these terms are not discussed here.  
 
Patients in vegetative states have all their automatic functions such as being able to 
breathe and are usually independent of all machines apart from the one delivering 
artificial nutrition and hydration. They display cycles of eye opening and closing (a 
sleep-wake cycle), and have reflexes such as retracting from pain; however, they have 
no apparent awareness of themselves or their environment (RCP 2013). The 
‘minimally conscious state’ is a relative new diagnosis only formally defined in 2002. 
In these cases patients appear unconscious much of the time, but occasionally show 
some minimal awareness e.g. saying words or showing emotional responses to family 
members (Giacino et al. 2002).  
 
In the past all such patients would have simply died (e.g. because they can not 
swallow); however modern technologies, and the way they are deployed, allow some 
patients to survive. Patients can now be ‘brought back to life’ after the initial crisis 
(e.g. being resuscitated after a cardiac arrest) and can then be sustained indefinitely 
(especially because of improvements in the provision of artificial nutrition and 
hydration). Advances in medicine ensures some patients have the chance of 
recovering to a quality of life they would consider worth living (e.g. fully conscious 
but with limited mobility or memory), but leaves others suspended in limbo in a state 
they would not have wanted. After 12 months in a vegetative state gaining full 
consciousness is considered highly unlikely (hence the term ‘permanent vegetative 
state’ - PVS); patients can recover full consciousness after much longer in MCS 
(perhaps even after several years) - however, even if they recover full consciousness 
they are likely to be left with severe physical and mental disabilities (e.g. dependent 
on 24/7 care, with minimal, if any, ability to communicate, and incapable of making 
their own decisions).  
 
The distinction between vegetative and minimally conscious conditions is important 
not only because it has implications for prognosis (e.g. likelihood of a return to full 
consciousness, however impaired), but because it can have implications for care (e.g. 
the provision of pain relief) and legal ramifications (e.g. in relation to treatment 
withdrawal and being allowed to die). However, diagnosis at the borderline of the 
vegetative state and minimally conscious states is often very challenging and there is 
a high rate of misdiagnosis. This may be not least because of the fluctuating nature of 
awareness for patients in MCS (and potential complicating conditions such as 
blindness or deafness). It is the difficulty of diagnosis and the intensity of ethical 
debates that makes this issue very complex and challenging, and means there is a 
great deal of interest in the conditions from the media, academic and practitioner 
stakeholders. 
 
Research on coma in the media: three strands of work 
Reviewing the existing literature on media coverage of coma and the vegetative or 
minimally conscious state identifies particular clusters of enquiry from researchers 
from diverse backgrounds. Such work can be broadly mapped into the following, far 
from mutually exclusive, often overlapping, approaches.  
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Film and literary studies: For some literary theorists coma serves as an exemplar 
through which to explore broader bioethical or political issues. One commentator, 
Richard Doyal, for example, is a Professor of English, and former editor of the journal 
‘Philosophy and Rhetoric’; he is interested in how ‘the narratives and practices of 
molecular biology have shifted the very concept of “life” at play in contemporary 
culture, as distinctions between “living systems” and “machines” have begun to blur 
and morph’. He argues that: ‘Comatose bodies cultivate yet another, singular 
execution of an informatic body. Accompanied by more than the visualization of an 
EEG and the machinic yoga of life support – breathe in! breathe out! – coma victims 
are connected to multiple rhetorical machines that would govern this strange flesh and 
enable its narration.’ (Doyal 2001:15). His article aims to ‘map out some of the 
capacities and threats posed by those bodies whose vitality is articulated as a signal, 
“wetwares” through and by which contemporary informatics operate’ (Doyal 2001: 
15). Other literary or film theorist have focussed on specific films (e.g Belling 2010), 
books (e.g. Hall 2014), or high profiles stories (such as the Schiavo case e.g. Walker 
2006) to draw out the implications for broader theoretical concerns. One interesting 
collection of articles bring diverse analytical tools to examining the videos of Terri 
Schiavo released by her family ‘purporting to show consciousness and 
responsiveness’ (Waldman, 2006, 1). These family videos were widely disseminated 
through news outlets including CNN, Fox News, MSNBC, as well as online ‘under 
the assumption that they make it self-evident that Terri could “react purposefully with 
her environment,” that she was not in a persistent vegetative state as neurologists had 
diagnosed’ ’ (Waldman, 2006, 1). This prompted critical academic engagement with 
the videos, the stills which circulated, and the online commentary the images attracted 
and led to a special issue of ‘Jump Cut’ (a journal ‘dedicated to ‘looking a media in its 
social and political context’). This special issue included an analysis of the legal, 
medical, and political context of the widely-seen Schiavo video excerpts, and 
engagement with the preferred reading offered by the family and their supporters 
(Waldman 2006) and a ‘cultural biography’ of the Schiavo images taken together as a 
"media event’ (Preston 2006) which aimed to ‘help us understand the social, cultural, 
religious, economic, and academic traffic in images: How does analyzing various 
images of Terri Schiavo help us understand the issues involved in the struggle over 
this woman's right to die/right to live?’ and asked questions such as ‘What part might 
images play in that struggle? What practices or beliefs can be said to have contributed 
to the images that became salient?’ (Preston 2006: 1). This collection includes 
contributors pointing out that ‘the visual is not self-evident. What the viewers bring to 
the image is extremely influential in what they see’ (Staiger 2006: 1) Staiger’s 
analysis, for example, highlights how, although her parents were offering the videos 
as evidence of some mental viability for Schiavo –in opposition to allowing her to die 
– others disputed the images as displaying consciousness or were horrified by, or 
dismissive of, anyone being kept alive in such a state (Staiger 2006). 
 
Sociology of science/health reporting: The interest of academics has also been 
engaged by scientific developments in the assessment of vegetative patients – 
especially attempts to detect consciousness. One of the most high-profile 
developments has been fMRI – functional magnetic resonance imaging – which 
allows researchers to look at more than simply the physical structures of the brain – 
giving insight into brain functioning (e.g. blood flow to different parts of the brain) in 
relation to different stimuli. The PR around, and media representation of, such 
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science/technology is of interest to researchers concerned about the social and ethical 
implications of science in general, and neurotechnologies in particular. Such 
researchers are often concerned with analysing issues such as the anticipatory 
discourse around the promise of neuro-therapies (Pickersgill 2011) and the need for a 
‘neuroethics’ (Illes et al., 2003). Such commentary also links to research interests in 
the ‘sociology of expectations’ and related work on the ‘political economy of hope’ 
which includes work highlighting how a ‘political economy’ or ‘rhetoric’ of hope has 
now become the dominant discourse of science, and research and development is 
justified by ‘the promise of finding miraculous cures for debilitating illnesses’ 
(Moreira and Palladino 2005: 67). 
 
One example of research pursued under this rubric is the study by Samuel and 
Kitzinger (2013) which focused on two ‘breakthrough’ studies where fMRI was used 
to detect brain activity, or even establish communication’ with patients with a 
vegetative diagnosis. The research was presented in press releases from the funding 
body with titles such as “Brain scan gives vegetative state patient the power to say 
Yes and No” (MRC press release 3 February 2010) and generated headlines such as 
“A voice for the voiceless” and “Brain damage patients CAN ‘talk’” (cited in Samuel 
and Kitzinger, 2013). Samuel and Kitzinger argue that both the press releases and the 
media reporting of this work involved some over-simplification and ‘hype’. They 
highlight the way in which some representations of the story failured to distinguish 
between vegetative and minimally conscious patients, exaggerated representations of 
the patients’ potential for recovery and promoted a one-dimensional view of family 
responses. Samuel and Kitzinger contextualise their analysis of source activity and 
media reporting by also drawing on interviews with family members. Such work 
shows, for example, that families with experience of serious brain injury don’t simply 
react to ‘breakthroughs’ such as fMRI with excitement and hope: some dread the idea 
that their loved-one may have any awareness, and feel that this is a ‘fate worse than 
death’ and that any signs of consciousness will only mean the person is trapped for 
longer in a more intolerable position than if they were entirely vegetative (Samuel and 
Kitzinger 2013). Other work with family members also highlights that some are 
sceptical about the powers of technologies such as fMRI to give ‘a voice to the 
voiceless’ or provide people with the ‘power to say ‘yes’ and ‘no’ given their 
experience in care homes at the bedside of their severely brain injured relatives. One 
mother for example, said she hoped her daughter (who was diagnosed as ‘vegetative’) 
was entirely unconscious, and would remain so, as she had seen how those who 
‘recovered’ were treated. She referred specifically to one young man in her daughter’s 
care home who had been given a communication aid: “he had one of these machine 
and he could say ‘I need some attention’ and then press the button and in the end, 
because he liked playing with it, […] they would switch his machine off, because he 
was doing it all the time […] / ‘Yeah, “you’ve got a voice, now you haven’t”’ 
(Kitzinger and Kitzinger 2012). In contrast to the optimistic claims of scientific PR 
statements about new inventions/technologies/discoveries, families thus locate such 
inventions in the everyday context of the social, legal, political and economic realities 
on the ground. 
 
Practitioner assessments of representation: The third strand of work produced in 
this area focuses on the representation (or misrepresentation) of facts in the news 
media and in documentaries. This is often a primary concern for scientists and 
clinicians in the field of brain injury, sometimes working in multi-disciplinary teams 
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(e.g with neuroethicists) and such analysis is often published in science or medical 
journals. This includes commentaries on the impact of high-profile cases – for 
example several articles focus on exploring the implications of the Schiavo coverage 
(Racine et al. 2008) and examining issues such as whether the coverage encouraged 
people to consider Advance Care Planning to record their own wishes in such 
situations (e.g. Sudore et al. 2008). It also includes a substantial body of work on 
fMRI such as: a discussion of the problems of public outreach when doing brain 
imaging work (Illes, Lau & Giacino 2008), a scientist’s reaction to an academic 
critique of some such outreach (Nachache 2014), and an editorial in the British 
Medical Journal (BMJ) challenging a TV documentary for the claims made about 
fMRI’s unique diagnostic contribution (Turner-Stokes et al, 2013). Articles in the 
clinical journals also criticise journalists for using distinct terms like "brain dead," 
"persistent vegetative state," and coma interchangeably (Wick and Zanni 2009: 874) 
and highlight the media’s failure to represent the profound disabilities that are the 
most likely outcome after many weeks in a ‘coma’. For example, analysis highlights 
how the media fail to show that survival with catastrophic brain injury is a possible 
outcome of resuscitation (and over represent the success of such interventions) (Diem 
1996) and give excessive or misleading news coverage of ‘miracle recoveries’. 
 
A second recurring issue in this literature is the problem of misrepresentation in 
fiction. Casarett et al (2005) for example, examined nine soap operas broadcast in the 
US between January 1995 and May 2005 and identified 64 characters who 
experienced ‘a period of unconsciousness lasting at least 24 hours’ (with some 
characters waking up or dying while still in a coma, and others entering vegetative 
states for prolonged periods). This study showed that mortality was significantly 
lower that would be predicted in real life. Recovery was also unrealistically positive: 
‘On the day that patients regained consciousness most (49/57: 86%) has no evidence 
of limited function, cognitive deficit, or residual disability needing rehabilitation’ and 
all ‘eventually regained full function’ (Casarett et al. 2005, 1). Casarett and colleagues 
point out that such recovery is very unusual: for instance ‘typical rates of full 
recovery from coma after a non-traumatic injury [e.g. a stroke or cardiac arrest] are 
usually less than 10%’ (Casarett et al. 2005, 2) – and these rates are even lower if the 
person has moved from being in a short term coma to conditions such as the 
vegetative state. A patient in a vegetative state for more than a few months is unlikely 
ever to be able to live independently again, and most will always need 24/7 care. 
 
Similar unrealistic representations of coma and vegetative states have been found in 
movies – which often show, sudden ‘awakenings’ from even long comas (i.e. 
vegetative states), with an immediate ability to talk, walk and with fully intact 
cognitive functions (Wijdicks and Wijdicks 2006). A study of 30 movies featuring 
‘prolonged comas’ also found that the representation of what a person looked like 
when they were in such states was very misleading – highlighting how all actors (with 
one exception) remained beautifully groomed, often muscular and tanned, and was no 
muscle wastage, contracture, evidence of double incontinence, or even feeding tubes 
(Wijdicks and Widjicks 2005). Patients are also shown peaceful, as if asleep, whereas 
patients in vegetative or minimally conscious states may grimace and appear 
distressed (e.g. struggling to breath, moaning or retracting from painful stimuli) and 
may cough and choke (because they can not swallow their own saliva). Another key 
finding of this study was that, with one exception, all patients were portrayed with 
their eyes closed – although a defining feature of the vegetative state is eye-opening. 
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This is only rarely represented by the media, but can have profound implications for 
family members who associate eye-opening with ‘waking up’ and the return of 
consciousness. (Nettleton et al. under review). 
 
Widjicks and Widjicks accompanied their analysis of film with surveys and found 
that many people thought such grossly over-optimist images were realistic and 
reported that it would influence their own decision making if they ever had a family 
member in such a state (Wijdicks and Wijdicks 2005, 1006). Wijdick and Wijdick’s 
concern echoes those raised by other clinicians/scientists and those working closely 
with families of brain injured patients that fictional representations could be 
associated with ‘unrealistic expectations of recovery’ which ‘often contribute to 
disagreements about treatment’ (Casarett et al, 2005, 1) – a view given support by 
findings from Kitzinger and Kitzinger who conducted an in-depth interview study 
with families. They found that many interviewees reported that the media images of 
coma had left them ill-equipped to face the real challenges of the situation, 
misinformed them about the possibilities of recovery, and hence led them to insist on 
life-sustaining treatments they now regret. Interviewess also described feeing isolated 
– because friends and acquaintances had no real understanding of the situation, and 
reiterated misleading ideas from the media (Kitzinger and Kitzinger, 2014). 
 
However, other commentators argue that it is important to acknowledge that fictional 
representations should not simply be judged against clinical realities. Rather, it is 
important to assess fictional fantasies of ‘waking up’ against against social 
assumptions that vegetative patients have no potential for recovery and are ‘as good 
as dead’ (or ‘worse than dead’). Jo Fins, is one key commentator here – both as a 
practising physician in the field and as president of the American Society for 
Bioethics and Humanities. He responded to the Wijdick and Wijdick analysis of films 
by arguing that: 
Cinematic "distortion" can also be understood as a compensatory artistic 
device that counters societal perceptions about brain injury which themselves 
may be inaccurate. From this broader cultural context, poetic license on the 
part of a filmmaker could be construed as a corrective.’ (Fins 2006)  
Fins highlights the ‘metaphorical’ power of the film to allow for hope and argues that 
a film criticised by Wijdick and Wijdick: 
anticipates the emerging diagnostic and prognostic significance of 
distinguishing the vegetative state from the recently described minimally 
conscious state. Patients who are minimally conscious may make gains that 
allow for the recovery of functional communication and some degree of 
reintegration with their families despite overwhelming levels of disability, 
generating complex ethical questions about what constitutes an acceptable 
clinical outcome.  
He concludes that the power of film to inspire and instruct may be lost when the 
critic's gaze is directed too literally at manifest medical content’ and suggests that ‘A 
broader cultural lens is required to consider neuropalliative goals of care’ (Fins 2006). 
Recommendations for future research: 
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The brief overview of research into media reporting of ‘coma’ highlights patterns 
echoed in coverage of other science/health issues, both with regards to the richness of 
diverse approaches and with regard to the debates around them. Research on ‘coma’, 
like that around many other science and health issues, addresses a wide range of 
media genre and analytical questions – from the issue of misrepresentation to the 
issue of fantasy. 
 
This overview highlights the need to locate any analysis of ‘media representation’ of a 
scientific/health issue within the history of that particular issue as well as 
contextualising the coverage through an understanding of the surrounding scientific, 
clinical or cultural debates. It also suggests how students might read such this 
literature with attention to the research design and the disciplinary background of the 
studies’ authors as well as highlighting how researchers might pursue cross-
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